



BALATUNG

Hiding Violence in Fair Sight

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



***Klitih* and the Search
for Respect**
Ian Wilson

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The roar of motorcycles breaks the silence on the lonely streets of Yogyakarta at night. A tense atmosphere rises to replace the broken silence. It is caused by the appearance of a group of teenagers carrying sharp weapons who goes back and forth looking for targets. The action which later became known as *klitih* took many casualties.

The issuance of circular regarding street crimes of *klitih* by the Governor of Yogyakarta has become a signal for the increasing number of *klitih* cases. The casualties become more random. Whereas in the past, *klitih* was a conflict between school gangs. The *klitih* case has become to be a new icon for the student city. All eyes are on *klitih* after it appeared in mass media. The hashtag #jogjadaruratklitih (#jogjaindanger-ofklitih) is the newest form of disappointment by the people with the failure to overcome *klitih*.

Educational institutions should be put on a spotlight because the perpetrators of *klitih* are covered with school alma maters. Students' spaces of expression are taken away by a rigid educational curriculum. Students find it difficult to place themselves in school because their interests and talents are not accommodated by the educational curriculum. This caused the search for new space of expression by the students. In gangs, they find space to express themselves. In addition, they also get recognition, role models, and a sense of security.

On the other hand, Yogyakarta educational institutions also handle *klitih* recklessly. The perpetrators of *klitih* are disciplined in various ways. Instead of being nurtured, they faced discrimination from the school. Moreover, every move of the perpetrators is monitored by students instructed by the teachers.

In return, the students will get good grades and the position of Student Council President.

Seeing this sad fact, BALAIRUNG intend to publish a magazine that cover the discussion about *klitih* and education in Yogyakarta. The issue of *klitih* and education is selected through a collaboration meeting of four different divisions in BALAIRUNG. The four divisions are Editorial, Research and Development, Enterprise, and Production and Artistic. This issue is chosen considering the responsibility of BALAIRUNG as the press who is obliged to present alternative discourse. Plenty of journalistic reports and scientific analyses seeking the root of the *klitih* problem have been published. However, analysis and report that examine education as the root of the *klitih* problem have yet to be widely published.

This magazine contains four thematic rubrics, namely two In-Depth articles, an article of Sisi Lain, and an article of Analysis. The first in-depth article discusses the relationship between *klitih* and education. The second in-depth article reveals the involvement of alums behind *klitih*. The Sisi Lain highlights the scapegoating of teachers when *klitih* occurred. The Discovery article presents the research result from BALAIRUNG regarding the failure of educational institutions in handling *klitih*. In addition to the four thematic rubrics, other non-thematic articles are also carrying the relevant youth theme in discussing *klitih*.

Through this magazine, we are trying to ignite the critical mind of our readers with this *klitih* issue. We want to offer a point of view: *klitih* is not merely a street problem, but also an educational problem.

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Content

- 06** EDITORIAL
Hiding Violence in Fair Sight
- 08** IN-DEPTH 1
Klitih in the Crossing Path of Education Policy
- 10** IN-DEPTH 2
School Ends, Cycle of Violence Remains Unbent
- 12** HUMAN INTEREST
Those Who are Called Upon When Juvenile Delinquencies Occurred

- 14** ANALYSIS
Klitih, Educational Institutions, and Failure
- 19** ILLUSTRATION
In Doubt
- 20** COLUMN
Klitih and the Search for Respect
- 22** COMICS
Jogja: The Dark Knight Rises
- 23** REBEL NOTE
A Little Lifeboat Called BALAIRUNG



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Hiding Violence in Fair Sight

Bullet after bullet was shot. Some people fell, some ran away headlessly. Among those who fell was Sumodiningrat, the Commander of Yogyakarta Palace in the British attack on the Yogyakarta Palace in 1812. His body was torn apart by bullets from the rifles of the British Sepoy Troops. But it did not stop there. John Deans, Secretary of the Yogyakarta Residency who led the Sepoy Troops at that time, slashed Sumodiningrat's neck, ending the life of the Commander who is known to be brave and angry. Not long after that, Prince Prangwedono who became known as Mangkunegara II followed John Deans. After staring at Sumodiningrat's stiff body, he said, "Makane ojo kementhus!" [That is why you should not be snobby!].

Prangwedono has a bitter grudge against Sumodiningrat. One time, Sumodiningrat laughed at Prawengdono's knighthood. He mocked Prangwedono as a fraudulent soldier and has no guts.¹ This insulting joke was taken seriously by Prangwedono. When the Mangkunegaran Legion participated in the attack of the British troops against the Yogyakarta Palace, Prangwedono stole an opportunity. The attack that lasted for three hours became Prangwedono's chance to avenge Sumodiningrat violently. After being paralyzed by John Deans' troops, Prangwedono initiated further violence. Sumodiningrat's clothes were stripped and looted. His body was then mutilated. Sumodiningrat's followers were only able to bury his body at 10 in the evening, 14 hours after the attack ended.

The grave of Sumodiningrat can still be visited somewhere in Jejeran, Bantul. The grave is deserted, gloomy, and cold. His fate is not as good as the Watu Gilang Petilasan which is located in Kotagede. It is a state-protected cultural area. The Petilasan (historic site) was a silent witness of the moment when Ki Ageng Mangir, the son-in-law and enemy of Panembahan Senopati, died at the hands of his own father-in-law.² In the chronicle of *Babad Tanah Jawi*, Panembahan Senopati's political desire is to subjugate the peasant movement led by Mangir in Kulon Progo. The strong, intelligent, and persistent figure of Mangir hinders these efforts. Because of that, Panembahan Senopati sent Retna Pembayun, his own daughter, to deceive Mangir. The figure of Mangir, as pictured by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, is a weak-willed figure when it comes to women.³ As a result, he was successfully deceived. Together with

Pembayun, he met Panembahan Senopati in Kotagede. Panembahan Senopati banged Mangir's head against the Watu Gilang plaque. Not only that, his head was also trampled to shreds. The chronicle of *Babad Bedhahing Mangir* even mentioned that Mangir's chest was stabbed by a spear before his head was banged against the plaque.

The two monuments may have had different fates. However, both of them contain memories of violence in Yogyakarta—memories that Yogyakarta is not only built on beautiful stories from the past, but also conflicts that led to violence. Muhidin M. Dahlan refer to both monuments as monuments of violence.⁴ Over the past few years, these memories are hidden like rotting corpses. Various image-polishing attempts were made to get rid of the smell of the corpses. Brochures, advertisements, and images in social media always portray Yogyakarta as a city full of harmony and peace. Yogyakarta's tourism brochures have never contained monuments of violence, such as the Grave of Sumodiningrat or Petilasan Watu Gilang. Violence in Yogyakarta has the same fate with the discourse of low minimum wage and gentrification. Its existence is covered up, unacknowledged, or even normalized.

However, the smell of the rotten corpses is too strong. Attempts to polish Yogyakarta's image ended in vain. Violence reappears on the surface. The violence is no longer centered on those monuments of violence. Every street in Yogyakarta can instantly turn into a monument of violence once the evening comes. However, the perpetrators of the violence are not rulers like Prangwedono or Panembahan Senopati. The perpetrators are actors who have been glorified in the romantic narrative of Yogyakarta as the City of Students. It is the students themselves.

With motorbikes, students who are members of student gangs go around the streets of Yogyakarta at certain times. One motorbike generally carries two people. One person acts as a driver, while the other acts as an executor with their sharp weapon. They attack in groups, targeting and injuring gang members from other schools.⁵ This practice is proliferating. In fact, even the victims are no longer fellow student gang members, but also the general public. In 2016, *Kedaulatan Rakyat* published an article titled "Yogyakarta Darurat Klitih". The use of the term *klitih*, which during 2000 until 2004 was limitedly used by student gangs, became widespread. Since the article from *Kedaulatan Rakyat* was published,

the general public used the term *klitih* to refer to the actions of these student gangs. The term that originally meant “Searching wind” was transformed into “Searching victims”.

Looking back, the emergence of *klitih* cannot be separated from the culture of violence in Yogyakarta. Before the yogyakarta students occupied themselves with *nglitih* (doing the act of *klitih*), they were used to doing street brawls.⁶ Thuggery that evolved in Yogyakarta in the 1980–1990s was the cause of it. This culture of thuggery causes brawls and other forms of open conflict to emerge. Street brawl once decreased after the Government of Yogyakarta issued a repressive regulation. Peraturan Walikota (Perwal) No. 24 of 2008 and Perwal No. 41 of 2010 regarding the Guidelines for the Formulation of School Disciplines forced schools to suspend students who were involved in brawls. Several school gangs disbanded due to the Perwals mentioned above.⁷ However, prohibition of open violence, such as street brawls, led to clandestine violence. As a result, *klitih* appeared as a new form of violence due to the incompetency of Government of Yogyakarta overcoming the old violence. Direct violence is immediately retaliated with structural violence. They fight fire with fire. They are reluctant to carry out a more critical and constructive effort to examine the *klitih* phenomenon. As a result, *klitih* is merely considered as juvenile delinquency.

Yohanes Marino's research found that *klitih* is more than mere juvenile delinquency. There are broader structural factors that are acting as the cause. In the education sector, *klitih* appears due to decreasing of room for expression inside the classrooms.⁸ The formal education curriculum that is too technical, narrow, and rigid, robs the students of their space to express themselves. The deprivation of spaces of expression leads to the exclusion of students. That curriculum excludes students—who, because of their interests and talents—do not fit with the curriculum. This condition forces these excluded students to find new spaces of expression. In gangs, they find not only space to express themselves, but also recognition, role models, and a sense of security.⁹ It is ironic to imagine that those three things are provided in student gangs instead of schools.

The presence of *klitih* certainly sparked reactions from various parties. *Klitih* gets far more attention compared to the previous forms of violence. The Government of Yogyakarta is again forced to overcome this new form of violence. Unfortunately, violence is again used to solve this new form of violence. Hearing about the *klitih* case that caused death, The Yogyakarta Regional Government appealed to law enforcements to severely punish the perpetrators of *klitih*, regardless of their age.¹⁰ Non-repressive efforts have also been attempted. Responding to the proliferation of *klitih*, The Office of Yogyakarta Education, Youth, and Sports (Disdikpora) collaborated with Indonesian Military (TNI) to educate *klitih* perpetrators. Disdikpora stated that the education of *klitih* perpetrators by TNI is not to punish them. They provided civic education, which is believed to be able to prevent violence.

There are several contradictions in that plan. Though it was not intended to punish, the choice to go with TNI as educator for the *klitih* perpetrators tends to be contradictory. TNI is a state agency

that holds the authority to do violence, or in a Max Weberian language, monopoly of violence.¹¹ In addition, TNI is undeniably an agency that has been involved in various greater acts of violence in various parts of Indonesia. In 2021, TNI was involved in 277 cases of violence.¹² If detailed in a broader place and period, the list of violence would go on and on, from Urutwesu to Papua. Hence, it is possible that such educational effort will only produce new forms of violence.

Another contradiction is found in the education material, namely civic education. The material for civic education has always been considered as a solution to various state problems, from violence, intolerance, to corruption. Just do the Civic Test (Tes Wawasan Kebangsaan–TWK). That is it—as if the nation is an entity without violence, intolerance, and corruption. This banal understanding is ultimately counterproductive. The TWK that was conducted to the employees of Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission) in 2021, for example, turned out to be eliminating actors who were proven to be top notch in eradicating corruption. This incident showed that civic education is ultimately not a solution to any problem. Instead, civic education is the state's effort to unify understanding, narrowing the movement of the general public. The same thing with the impact of education curriculum to perpetrators.

Yogyakarta has a long history of violence. It is always covered up instead of being solved, likewise *klitih*. The Government of Yogyakarta chose to cut corners by giving repressive punishments and misguided guidance. The City of Students wrongly overcomes violence. On one hand, violence cannot be tolerated. However, taming violence with other violence is not the solution.

To sum up, enjoy reading and drive safe!

[Editor in Chief]

This article was originally written in bahasa Indonesia under the title “Lempar Citra Sembunyi Kekerasan”. Translation by Aldyth Nelwan Airlangga.

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***Klitih* in the Crossing Path of Education Policy**

The case handling of klitih in Yogyakarta has run into an intricate condition. Avoiding responsibility oftentimes happened in the case handling of klitih. Moreover, the educational institution, which is responsible for fixing the behavior of its students, has not put much effort into it.

Ice cubes were delved into a cup of milk coffee, then was swirled unanimously as those brawny hands stirred the surface. When the coffee and milk became a single entity, the owner of those brawny hands rushed to quench his thirst. His stare projected a smile. A voice came out with no rush. His mouth was busy with a cigarette blazing in its tip. Clumps of smoke were dancing in the air as his opening words spewed from his mouth. He is Suro (a pseudonym) a former *klitih* perpetrator who now became a teacher in one of the high schools in Yogyakarta. Interviewed in a coffee shop, Suro recounts his past to BALAIRUNG. “I decided to leave the *klitih* gang when I graduated from highschool,” Suro said when asked about his association with the *klitih* gang right now.

Suro wants to guide his juniors to stay away from violent acts. Suro’s motivation rose when he felt that something needed to be fixed in Yogyakarta’s educational environment. “I have a purpose to guide students who still join the *klitih* gang,” he stated.

However, his intentions evidently receive an unsupportive response from his fellow teachers. In his teaching place, Suro’s presence is considered a threat to the people sitting in the school counselor position. “Because I am an expert in that issue,

the school is discriminating me,” he said. School counselors, according to Suro, are discriminating him by spreading hatred opinions toward him.

Suro’s effort to prevent *klitih* from the education sector was affirmed by Soeprapto, lecturer of Sociology in UGM. He stated that the emergence of *klitih* could not be separated from education. According to Soeprapto, education is one of five institutions that shaped children’s character, aside from family, education, religion, economy, and government. “Those five institutions should work together to make preventive measurements,” he stated.

More specifics, Soeprapto explained that the connection between *klitih* and education can be seen from the Government of Yogyakarta’s effort to discipline the violent act of students. In 2008, the Government of Yogyakarta took firm action toward students who were involved in brawls through Perwal No. 24 of 2008 and Perwal No. 41 of 2010 for the Guidelines for the Formulation of School Disciplines (Mayor Regulations). Students who violate those rules will be expelled from the school as a penalty.

According to Soeprapto, those regulations made students to choose other activities to express their existence. He argued that such things become reasons for students to do *klitih*. “I hope that

there will be a collaboration between educational institutions and basic social institutions in an attempt to create a space which enable students to express themselves,” he added.

Hasyim, Head of the Junior High School Counseling Division, Yogyakarta Youth Education and Sports Office (Disdikpora), denied those arguments. He stated that education has no connection with the existence of *klitih*. “Education clearly teaches the student to have good character and religious acts that suit the Student Pancasila Profile,” Hasyim explained.

Instead of explaining the connections between *klitih* and education, Hasyim blames the family of the perpetrators. “Perhaps in that family, there is dissonance between parents, hence there is less attention to children,” he stated. He also added that the role of school institutions is limited to the process of learning and teaching. More than that, when students finish their studies at school, their acts become the responsibility of the parents.

Besides family, Hasyim also pointed out the role of the people around the neighborhood of the perpetrators as the factor that affects the appearance of *klitih*. “There is no room to actualize the energy in the community,” he continued. Hasyim concluded that the nonexistence of the space of expression in the community around the neighborhood has led to the appearance of *klitih*.

In response to the space of expression, Hasyim stated that Disdikpora has facilitated the space of expression through extracurricular activity. Besides the extracurricular activity, according to Hasyim, the room of expression has also been opened through an event called “*Gelar Pelajar*”. That event is created as a chance to express the ability of students. “Besides ‘*Gelar Pelajar*’, we have facilitated sports and art competitions that have been held annually,” Hasyim explained.

Accusation towards Disdikpora's Claim

In response to Disdikpora claims, Suro stated an opposite comment. In his view, space of expression certainly has been created through extracurricular activity at school. However, it is not effective because it is not in accordance with the talent and interest of the students. “If I have an interest in basketball, that could be channeled through the extracurricular, but the others’ interest could not always be channeled,” he said.

According to Suro, extracurriculars are not the only thing that is not accommodative enough to the talent and interest of students, but educational institutions are also not helping the students to find their talent and interest. In line with Suro, Soeprapto also stated that the expression of students could not be generalized. “The making of space of expression must be adjusted by the talent and interest of the students,” he added.

The researcher of *klitih*, Yohanes Marino, also identified similar findings in his research. He found that schools in Yogyakarta evidently have facilitated many spaces of expression through extracurricular activity. “However, those extracurriculars have yet to accommodate the students,” he stated. He also added that schools never asked about the interest of their students’ future careers.

In response to those comments, Suhrman, Deputy Head of Dikpora Yogyakarta, added that the space of expression, which has been facilitated, is not only limited to extracurricular activities. Dikpora also initiated the “innovative” activity which has been done by OSIS–Indonesian student council. Those

innovations are activities such as visitation to social homes and specific programs for students to enter *pondok pesantren*–Islamic boarding school–with the duration of two to three days. In addition to that, OSIS also arranges social services outside of school. “Unfortunately, this activity is not effective because it has been followed by those who have the potential to do *klitih*,” he said.

Suhrman added, besides innovative activities to facilitate the space of expression for students, Dikpora also cooperates with the Indonesian Military (TNI) and The Indonesian National Police (Polri). Together with counselor teachers, TNI and Polri educate students who are involved with *klitih*. In addition to that, Dikpora also opens the Communication Forum for OSIS Committee (FKPO). “Therefore, the high school OSIS committee in Yogyakarta is collected, so if there is information, it could be delivered directly,” he cleared.

“What makes me stressed is that those students are being taught to act corrupt, lured by score, lured by the head of OSIS position, etc.”

Suhrman continued, Dikpora also coordinates continuously with school principals to follow up every information about potential juvenile delinquency as soon as possible. He said that if there is a report, Dikpora would handle it directly, searching for a school that is indicated to be involved and communicating with its principals. “Principals must not hide such cases, because Dikpora is unable to handle it single-handedly,” Suhrman said.

Nonetheless, reality in the field is different from Suhrman’s statement. According to Suro, information about *klitih* are collected by school through students who are made into observer agents. Those students are lured by school with strategic OSIS positions and good scores to do their job as observer agents. Suro’s statement is proven by Hasyim’s comment which states that the school has made several students as information agents to report suspicious acts. This situation has been a concern for Suro. “What makes me stressed is that those students are being taught to act corrupt, lured by score, lured by the head of OSIS position, etc.,” Suro complained.

Until now, The case handling of *klitih* has not been handled effectively. This could be seen when BALAIRUNG asked the data of students who joined the *klitih* gang to Hasyim. His gesture indicates that he hide something when we asked about the data repeatedly. “There is no data because we keep privacy. We still think that those students are good,” Hasyim stated. He explained that his institution does not want to stereotype the students as bad. The indecisiveness from the school in handling the *klitih* problem becomes a concern for Suro. He stated that the school does not perform preventive acts. “In general, schools will only take action after the schools are in trouble,” he complained. **[Eleonora, Puspa, Putra, and Putri]**

This article was originally written in bahasa Indonesia under the title “*Klitih di Persimpangan Jalan*”.

Translation by Albert Nathaniel.

School Ends, Cycle of Violence Remains Unbent



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Klitih is not only born out of juvenile shenanigans but also from a school gang culture inherited by senior gang members who had graduated. The interference of gang members who graduated is embedded without the school providing a barrier, turning the intentions of students who originally wanted to get a proper education into criminals. Are the gang members who have graduated entirely to blame?

The stage towered majestically in the middle of the field, surrounded by views of dry weeds and groups of young men engrossed in dancing to the rhythm of the drums. When the singer sang a dangdut—a genre of Indonesian music that combines elements of Arab and Malay folk music—song with a lilting twist, Kliwon (a pseudonym) could not bear to dance with his friends. Melted sweat washed away the scars all over his body. He was wracked with pain but could not contain the feeling of the swelling interest. Thirty minutes ago, Kliwon had just overthrown a gang member who is still a high school freshmen. Bruises on his body didn't feel torturous. When the drums started beating, Kliwon only understood two things he had to do, fighting and dancing.

Amid the hustle and bustle of coffee shops, Kliwon, a former gang member from a high school in Jetis, Yogyakarta City, reminisces about his past. He had participated in fraternity nights twice when

he was active as a member of the klitih gang. Senior member started the event by advising younger gang members. Then, they danced in front of the dangdut show at the end of the event. Aside from those agendas, the new members were pitted against each other by the gang alumnus. Older gang members and alumni flocked to watch them exchange blows in the middle of the field. “Come on, go on! Ngopo wedi? [Why are you afraid?]” said Kliwon imitating the cheers from the audience.

The presence of alums who participate in and out of various gang activities is not only felt by Kliwon. Wage (a pseudonym), a former gang member from a high school in Kotagede, Yogyakarta City—also had contact with alumni who attended the fraternity night. Alumni who come will observe the new generation to be inaugurated. He said that during the event, a member would be taken to be beaten, and alums would provoke the others, “Look at that, your friend has been beaten,” said Wage, imitating the words of alumni.

Not only attending the inauguration night, Wage said that alumni were further involved in gang affairs. "Alumni are supporting actors when there are problems in the gang," he explained. The alumni's intervention when one of his classmates broke the rules of the gang is still fresh in his mind. Gang members from the same batch were ordered to stand in a line. Then, several alumni from 2012 came in droves. Behind them, the more senior gang members followed suit. "At that time, the problem was so serious that a physical forum was held. We were beaten up together," explained Wage.

This alumni involvement, according to Wage, occurs because alumni still often come to hangout places to ask about the condition of the gang. However, Wage said alumni involvement in each school's *klitih* gang differs. In his school gang, alumni involvement is closely related to the reasoning behind the school gang establishment. Wage admitted that his school gang was formed to increase the school's prestige. "In my school, alumni are involved in making events to increase the prestige of the school," he said.

In the Wage school gang, alumni are not allowed to hold management in the gang. Wage said that alumni only hung out and asked about the condition of the gang. He explained that the hangout place for gangs is usually also in the alumni's food stall. "For example, if you want to keep weapons, you can also give them to alumni," said Wage. Even so, according to him, alumni can intervene in gangs through non-structural actions, such as giving advice. However, if problems arise after the gang takes action, alumni can do more. They can even do a "Physical Forum."

Things found to be different in the Kliwon school gang. He said that alumni in his *klitih* gang had further involvement. Alumni are said to often watch and monitor their juniors in running the gang. "In fact, they still often direct the dynamics of the gang," he added.

In addition to the inauguration night, alumni also attended the "Forum". This activity is held if there are members who are in conflict with gangs from other schools. "In the 'Forum', they advised us not to make trouble with people outside the school," said Kliwon.

The two accounts about the involvement of alumni in gangs are in line with the facts revealed by Jarot Wahyu Winasis, the Yogyakarta Penitentiary Youth Community Advisor. While accompanying the perpetrator during the trial, he often witnessed the arrival of alumni. They were busy waiting for the trial outside the building. "Even when the accused has been sent to prison, they are still monitoring the news," said Jarot.

Jarot found that the alumni who masterminded the *klitih* action were from educated backgrounds. Just like young people in general, they get their education in college. "There are also alumni who are law students, so they know the loopholes for committing crimes," said Jarot.

The School's Response

On the other hand, schools' attitudes towards students who take *klitih* actions are different. Some schools do not care about their students doing *klitih*, but some schools are strict with expelling their students. At Wage's school, the school did not take the cliché actions taken by the students seriously.

"There are also alumni who are law students, so they know the loopholes for committing crimes."

"Schools only act as a formality to students who are involved in *klitih* cases," said Wage.

Meanwhile, Kliwon said that it was different when the school found out the whereabouts of students involved in the *klitih* gang. He said his school carried out formalities (punishments) and marked the student. "The school often discriminated," he explained. Kliwon explained that whenever there was a problem at school, these students always served as the black sheep of said accusation. He feels embarrassed when the teacher presses a student who is marked in a position that is always guilty.


Wage revealed the fact that the school only cares about maintaining accreditation. He also argued the school as money-oriented in responding to the cases of its students. "Students whose parents deposit big lumps of money into the school will be punished less than ordinary students with the same case," he explained.

Not only that, Wage explained that the school wants to boost its reputation by promising to punish problematic students. "Strict action is usually taken in the form of a warning letter or expulsion," he added. However, according to Wage, in its implementation, schools do not care about students who do *klitih* actions.

Suro, a former *klitih* actor now a teacher at a high school in Yogyakarta, gave a similar testament. His school imposes heavy punishment that can result in students being expelled from school when caught committing *klitih*. "Students will be safe if they obey to pay school bills," explained Suro.

Suro views that the school only prohibits students from doing *klitih* without providing character improvement therapy for their students. From his experience, schools will only take action when students already have problems while taking no preventive measures. According to him, through the homeroom meeting, the school only mapped the list of students involved in school gangs without any further prevention. "From me to education, stop being two-faced!" said Suro. **[Adzim, Alvi, and Ilham]**

This article was originally written in bahasa Indonesia under the title "Habis Lulus Pertahankan Siklus". Translation by Refina Anjani Puspita.



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Those Who are Called Upon When Juvenile Delinquencies Occured

Teachers have always been made a scapegoat for juvenile delinquency happening in school. On the other hand, the Indonesian education system does not provide much room for teachers to handle juvenile delinquencies. How much role and authority do teachers in Yogyakarta have in handling juvenile delinquencies?

The evening scene in Samas street, Bantul, is not as peaceful as the previous evenings. The sunset harmony as though stripped by the sounds of *celurit* (an Indonesian sickle-like weapon) that brush through the street. A gear tied to a belt was swung around to add to the terrifying atmosphere. Screams of curse words came out of the mouths of teenagers that are going on a convoy riding through the city's main street. Accompanied by the luminescence of sunlight piercing through the gray cloud, dozens of teenagers from one of the high schools in Bantul are carrying out an act of vengeance.

A few days before, a group from the neighboring school roared their motorcycle in front of their hideout. They considered this an act of disrespect. With their pride trampled on, a squadron is prepared to ambush the trespasser's school.

Unfortunately, their act was commemorated through one of the perpetrator's camera lenses. It does not take much longer for the internet to be in an uproar. Once the video made its way into the hands of the police, they knew that their life would take a turn for the worse. "Jingan! Bar meh nyerang kuwi to, mbengine raiku wes ono neng ngendi-endi! [Son of a bitch! After I was going to attack, my face was everywhere at night! -editor]," the organizer of that

evening's act, Alex (not a real name) bitterly remarked.

The reggae tone of Bob Marley's "No Woman No Cry" follows the conversation between BALAIRUNG and Alex in a humble *warung kopi*, a small Indonesian coffee shop. He told us the story of his ambush and arrests, chapter by chapter. Alex was arrested along with sixteen of his friends. The police apprehended a handful of *celurit*, belts topped with gears, and ten motorcycle units as the evidence of the attack.

Article 2, paragraph 1 of the emergency act number 12 of 1951, with ten years of prison threats, is currently waiting for them in court. Consequently, they must undergo a rehabilitation program routinely in the Wonosari precinct. Every Monday and Thursday, they must do a morning parade, pay their respect to the red and white flag, and sign a paper for their proof of attendance.

The school is also involved. The Bantul State Attorney was invited to give counseling as part of the rehabilitation plan to educate Alex and his friends. Moreover, teachers are also involved in educating them. "The school guidance counselor was the only one who helped me improve," added Alex. He is pleased with the school counselor's behavior, which gives him evaluation and solutions in an evaluative way. Woefully, not all teachers in his school supported him to change.

Instead of support, they showered Alex with mean comments and rained of negative stigma.

Deep in thought, he is jealous of his teacher's behavior, who only gives attention to students with good academic performances. In class, his teacher only made him as a bad example. "That one time I heard a teacher made me an object of learning for the class next door," Alex continued his story.

He starts getting furious over his teachers' responses, which negatively meddle with his private life. "Even my girlfriend was asked 'why would you date someone like him?' by the teachers," Alex carried on. Sick of being mistreated, he responded by prolonging his record of skipping classes. The act ends with a letter the school presented to call his parents to the school.

The school's ineffective responses in handling cases of juvenile delinquencies are also shown in Tiwi's story, a student of Bantul 1 Public School. She has once seen a few kids from another school freely going to the school grounds while roaring their motorcycle loudly. "To tell the truth, at that time, I was scared, and it's dangerous for the other students," uttered Tiwi. She has even heard that the hideout near the school is surrounded by students who openly smoke and drink.

The story of Alex and Tiwi points out a series of questions. Is the inefficiency of the teacher's work contribute to the rampant juvenile delinquency? Could teachers be blamed for this massive complex problem that has been happening lately?

Yohanes Sumardianto, a Kolese De Britto High School sociology teacher, tries to debunk these dilemmatic questions. Sumar begins his argument with the proverb, "the apple does not fall far from the tree." For him, parents are the first to be held responsible for student delinquencies. Bewildered, he is confused by the whispers going around his ears: why are teachers the ones to blame when students misbehave?

"They slash people with gears and other sharp weapons without feeling guilty because they can't differentiate between the right and the wrong," said Sumar. To him, this happened because of the lack of discipline in the student's home. He questions the parent's reasoning as to letting their children go out over 9 o'clock, the hour when these delinquent students strike. Although, they have to go to school in the morning. Sumar pities that without paradigm, affection, and enough attention would make children look for attention elsewhere.

Tjatur Budiarti concurs. She has been the school guidance counselor at Bantul 1 Public School since 1986. She took the time to discuss this problem with us in between her teaching time. In her opinion, parents are too dependent on the school to educate their children without any interference. However, she thinks that parents are the first teaching agent. "Children who are not given a good education from home will think that learning activities are not interesting," uttered Tjatur. She stated that delinquent ideas would sprout from a non-academic environment.

Tjatur investigates the origin of this juvenile delinquency that she has often encountered since she started teaching. According to her, it all started from the teenager's instinctive need to be acknowledged by their peers. "Some of those teenagers did not get that in the academic field; hence they organized other activities with their friend group," She said while smiling, reminding us of a motherly teacher figure back in high school.

Tjatur speculated that deviant behavior that shows status, such as street fights between gangs or *klitih* (an act of hurting someone at night, typically done by teenagers), starts from that kind of gap. She realized that those activities are done outside of the school's jurisdiction. Like how one rotten apple spoils the barrel, social deviance came between them.

Responding to Tjatur, Sumar concludes that juvenile delinquency happens because of two main factors. *Firstly*, an imperfect socialization process both at home and school. *Secondly*, bad influences from their clique. Without thinking before acting, teenagers are easier to influence when surrounded by bad crowds.


In the end, Sumar is only a teacher. In a complex situation like this, he realized he could not do much because of the restriction of institutional regulation. But, he does not deny that teachers could prevent this by suppressing provocation between students before an unwanted incident occurs. "However, we could only slightly stop it through this narrow classroom wall," said Sumar anxiously.

Compared to the previous generations, Sumar thinks teenagers nowadays are more fragile, so they need the correct guidance and education to help them build their character. With flames in his eyes, Sumar explained that schools and teachers need to give a balanced room for developing the student's intellectual skills and personalities. "Students should not only study from books but also the local community," he explained. Stroking his head, Sumar state that it is essential for schools to involve students in, among others, Basic Leadership Training and social service.

Attempting a concrete solution, Tjatur states that the teacher's role and the school are not enough to handle the entirety of this problem. "We need to work with parents and the people around students to keep an eye on them," she explained. When assuming one of her students to be a *klitih*, Tjatur even asked for the help of sellers around the school. She hoped that the said student could be watched so actions that concerned locals could be stopped immediately.

In the end, Tjatur also reveals her vexation toward the government that should have been involved in removing juvenile delinquency. Not only thinking of the law instrument to boost a deterrent effect but a preventive mechanism is also needed. As the bell rings, Tjatur confesses, "Places to express students' needs outside of school must also be increased," [Catharina, Fahrul, and Sekar]

This article was originally written in bahasa Indonesia under the title "Mereka yang Dicari ketika Kenakalan Remaja Terjadi". Translation by Catharina Maida M.



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***Klitih*, Educational Institutions, and Failure**

The involvement of students in klitih cases indicates institutional problems in educational institutions in the so-called “Student City” of Yogyakarta.

Along the winding roads of Yogyakarta, there is a rancid smell of blood from last night’s slash. When the lights go out, the streets become a wilderness, with dangers looming. In an instant, a machete whizzed through the air. The tip of the machete can cut anyone’s neck indiscriminately. So, who is the culprit? Criminal or student? Whoever did it, everyone, by consensus, called them *klitih*. Nowadays, *klitih* has become the talk of the town, highlighted by the mass media that frames *klitih* with the stigma of crime and nullifies the human aspect. The word “*klitih*” experienced a pejorative turn. Originally it meant wandering teenagers in a positive sense into *kliling golek getih* (going around out for blood). Yogyakarta abounds with news of *klitih* in action.

In the mainstream, *klitih* is a phenomenon that involves students as the leading actor. However, *klitih* as a manifestation of juvenile delinquency is the formation of institutions that contribute to shaping individual subjects in it. This raises the question, have the institutions, in this case, the educational institutions of Yogyakarta, taken an essential role in tackling *klitih*? The role of institutions should correlate with the issue at hand. Institutions accommodate not only internal problems related to long-term administration but also external problems related to the people who depend on them. In this case, the perspective of new institutionalism offers renewal for the institutional analysis model, offering more depth and context sensitivity for handling *klitih*.

New Institutionalism

Institutional theory discusses various perspectives that interpret the relationship between institutions (internal) and individual behavior (external). Institutional theories also address the need for groups to adapt to the institutional environment, such as norms, rules, and

proper behavior. Institutions can be essential in reducing information transactions and uncertainty within the institution's scope and help monitor and encourage critical policy and/or decision. In this context, institutions can play either an active or passive role.¹ Institutions are defined as systems that regulate social interaction and are a crucial structure in life.²

The conception of institutionalism is accompanied by various changes molded to help address and overcome impending problems. Two traditions, old institutionalism, and new institutionalism (neo-institutionalism), are the primary progenitor of institutional theory. Old institutionalism has normative (related to good government), structuralist (structure determines political behavior), historical (a major influence on history), legalist (law plays a significant role in government), and holistic characteristics (related to describing and comparing all systems of government). However, the old institutionalism has limitations in scope and methods. The old institutionalism's main focus was formal rules rather than informal conventions. It also focuses on the official structure of government rather than broader institutional boundaries.³

On the other hand, neo-institutionalism believes that formal and informal structures are equally crucial to institutional theory.⁴ Neo-institutionalism has several derivatives of institutionalism studies: *inter alia*, normative institutionalism discusses the norms and values inherent in institutions, historical institutionalism discusses the history of institutions as an important basis for decision-making and changes in institutions, rational choice institutionalism discusses utility maximization, sociological institutionalism discusses the process of creating institutional meaning for individuals external to institutions and provides an important theoretical basis for normative institutionalism in political science.⁵ The diversity of neo-institutionalism studies implies blowing the canon. Not one theory has the highest truth value, but all of them are a collection of theories that complement each other to investigate institutions.

Institutions, Education, and Their Functions

For institutions to run appropriately, they need a well-defined function and formation. However, if one of the two does not work well, the institution will not only fail in achieving its goals but will also cause harm to the social life of the wider community.⁶ This loss is apparent in *klitih*.

Education is an important institution in the discourse of institutionalism. Emile Durkheim, a sociologist and an early institutional theorist, has tried to define the mission of education that correlates to and emerges as manifestations of institutions. Durkheim stated that contemporary educational institutions seek to form individuals with autonomous personalities. Meanwhile, in ancient Athens, educational institutions sought to form souls capable of enjoying the beauty and joy of pure speculation through inner harmony and pleasure. In Rome, they wanted, above all, children to be men of action, devoted to military glory, and indifferent to literature and art. The development of institutional discourse in education shows the importance of institutions as controllers and balancers of educational discourse in accordance with the era.⁷

This article focuses on three derivatives of neo-institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. The three derivatives of neo-institutionalism are adequate in the discourse of neo-institutionalism.⁸ The main objective is to gather as much information as possible and then analyze the urgency of Yogyakarta educational institutions in tackling *klitih*.

Based on research conducted by the BALAIRUNG, there was no official report on the tangible results of the counseling and *klitih* settlement efforts on the website of the Yogyakarta Provincial Youth and Sports Education Office (Dikpora Yogyakarta)—Yogyakarta's educational institution.⁹ Through the agency's website, the government announces activities related to *klitih* without providing the community with updates on program developments, instead carrying out reconstruction and evaluation of internal systems. The omission of information regarding the follow-up to the *klitih* eradication program can give rise to the assumption that *klitih* has no hope of being eliminated. In fact, *klitih*, as it exists, can be a symptom of institutional management problems. It is crucial not only to look at the problem from an actor-based perspective but also to study institutions and their systems.

Until this moment, the Yogyakarta Government has not passed any particular policies regarding *klitih*. The Governor of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, suspects that someone is enlivening the *klitih* problem with a tendency to damage the image of Yogyakarta.¹⁰ Moreover, it is not uncommon for the media to approach *klitih* as an individual problem instead of highlighting how the government and educational institutions deal with them. This conclusion can arise because the existing institutions only report eradication efforts without providing a transparent evaluation

The Urgency of the Historical Paradigm in Educational Institutions

The paralysis of historical reading and a one-way view of historicity make for an outdated approach. Historical institutionalism (HI) argues that choices made by institutions influence individual decision-making and future conditions. Therefore, according to HI, it is essential to return to history. But beyond predicting the future, HI seeks to contextualize historical analysis that must be per social reality.¹¹

In HI, there are two critical benchmarks, namely path dependence as a tool for analyzing the historicity of institutions and critical junctures as a guide for institutions to contextualize internal and external conditions of institutions. *Path dependence* describes how the initial event exerts causal power on further events in the sequence. *Critical juncture* is a period of uncertainty that triggers an institution to reach a crisis point.¹² Path dependence and critical juncture are two factors driving the emergence of change.

A path dependence analysis on the *klitih* phenomenon can be seen by looking at the events of the determination of Perwal No. 24 of 2008 and Perwal No. 41 of 2010 concerning Guidelines for the Preparation of School Rules as a causal force (Mayor Regulation). The emergence of the Perwal was triggered by the high and uncontrolled intensity of student brawls in Yogyakarta. The regulation states

that students who violate these regulations will be expelled. However, the Perwal does not suppress student delinquency. This regulation ignites student delinquency in a new way. Students choose the option of doing *klitih* which tends not to be easily identified and is sporadic.¹³

Suhirman, the Deputy Head of Dikpora Yogyakarta, the *klitih* crisis began when the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, the *klitih* phenomenon emerged with various anomalies such as *klitih* actions by non-students. In an interview, according to him, the biggest obstacle is unraveling the thread of the *klitih* phenomenon completely. The transition from online to offline learning makes it challenging to analyze *klitih* actors. The status of the *klitih* perpetrators becomes difficult to identify, such as who is the perpetrator? Students, alums, or non-students? This uncertainty in identifying *klitih* perpetrators has made the phenomenon, in the eyes of the Dikpora Yogyakarta, meet a critical juncture.¹⁴ Therefore, Dikpora Yogyakarta made some changes.

In 2021, Dikpora Yogyakarta made several institutional changes, namely internal structural reforms, by forming small teams to focus on issues. The team was formed without a formal decision letter. Furthermore, after the critical juncture, the Dikpora Yogyakarta established regulations and special budget allocation for *klitih*. The regulation gives schools full authority to make their own rules. As a caveat, the regulation also involves the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the Indonesian Police instilling anti-crime values into the students. Instead of creating a non-repressive space, the involvement of the apparatus has the opposite potential. Starting in 2022, Dikpora Yogyakarta plans to collect data on students linked with *klitih* from each school. This collection aims to complete the special *klitih* budget plan that will be officiated in the 2022 APBD (Regional Government Budget) Planning.

Dikpora Yogyakarta has implemented a mechanism for institutional change according to the HI discourse. However, they have not succeeded in implementing HI holistically. Dikpora Yogyakarta only focuses on group change based on internal interests instead of seeing *klitih* as an educational problem. Forming a small team without issuing a decree indicates an attempt to classify the plans. Furthermore, handing over authority to schools to form their own rules does not make them autonomous. The police and TNI are still intertwined in handling *klitih*. The public is left in the dark regarding the draft budget. If the special *klitih* budget means funding for *klitih* rehabilitation carried out by the TNI or the police, then *klitih* control is still not through education.

Furthermore, Dikpora Yogyakarta does not want to show data related to *klitih* prevention that the public can observe. This is apparent in how the Dikpora Yogyakarta is reclusive concerning yearly institutional quality figures and training levels, hindering the process of external institutionalism. Dikpora Yogyakarta is still beholden to old institutionalism, which emphasizes that change and innovation are only the internal business of institution governors. Thus, the Dikpora Yogyakarta cannot operationalize neo-institutionalism's values for *klitih*. It can be surmised that Dikpora Yogyakarta has failed as an educator and as an institution. They are not contextual to social reality and have not been able to offer a holistic approach between institutions and society. As long

as Dikpora Yogyakarta does not involve all or at least more parties, *klitih* will only be pummeled by legal, repressive, and punitive power.

As long as Dikpora Yogyakarta does not involve all or at least more parties, klitih will only be pummeled by legal, repressive, and punitive power.

Rationality of Klitih Handling

Klitih entangles individuals, groups, and institutions that oversee and have the authority to manage the issues. One entanglement is the relationship between schools and the education office at the city/district and provincial levels. This is a practical example of neo-institutionalism in action, seeing inter-institution interaction.

Dikpora Yogyakarta is regulated in Yogyakarta Governor Regulation Number 68 of 2018 as an agency under the governor that is obliged to administer secondary education, including the provision of educators and facilities, as well as the formulation of education, youth, and sports policies. A *klitih* case involving school students means that the Dikpora Yogyakarta must play a role in its resolution.

The success or failure of the efforts made by educational institutions can be analyzed through the Rational Choice Institution (RCI) approach. This theory becomes a "theory of advice" that informs individuals or, potentially, collectivities of individuals, about the best way to achieve goals.¹⁵ RCI views institutions as a set of rules that organize social interactions in a certain way. These rules (1) provide information about how people are expected to act in certain situations, (2) can be recognized by those who belong to the relevant group as rules that apply to others in these situations, and (3) shape the strategic choices of actors to produce balance.¹⁶

Seeing through the lens of RCI we are brought to Dikpora Yogyakarta's effort to organize art competitions such as the regional level of the National Student Art Festival and Competition. The institution also plans to provide Jogja Creative Care, a special dormitory for ex-*klitih* actors; and holding trainings and educations in collaboration with the Office of Women's Empowerment, Child Protection, Population Control and Family Planning and security forces.¹⁷ This step is rational because it functions as a steppingstone with the final result in the form of minimizing *klitih*. However, this measure has not proven effective.

Currently, Dikpora Yogyakarta has given authority to schools to handle *klitih* cases in their respective agencies. However, this delegation of authority creates informants or "*cepu*" which has become entrenched in one school.¹⁸ This phenomenon involves students who are members of a *klitih* gang. In return for espionage, they are promised a prominent position at the school. They reported the perpetrator to the school. The *klitih* perpetrator was caught and ended up expelled from school. While the "spy" remained safe, their name wasn't even on the chronology of events. This phenomenon means that Dikpora Yogyakarta

should ensure that the efforts made by schools do not use repressive and corrupt methods, such as luring their students, so that they can effectively provide change for the actors and their communities. Based on these findings, it can be highlighted that Dikpora Yogyakarta does not make decisions based on educational methods. Decision-making and policy decentralization carried out by Dikpora Yogyakarta tend to take legalistic and repressive methods that are easier to apply. Using espionage is a corrupted practice, one that has become embedded and a pattern of play to overcome *klitih* internally. Seeing through the lense of RCI, this pattern indicates the failure of Dikpora Yogyakarta in making strategic decisions that result in a balance in policy.

Seeing through the lense of RCI, this pattern indicates the failure of Dikpora Yogyakarta in making strategic decisions that result in a balance in policy.

Dikpora Yogyakarta is Isomorphic

In the discourse of neo-institutionalism, the main thesis of sociological institutionalism (SI) is isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism first appeared in the work of DiMaggio and Powell entitled "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields".¹⁹ DiMaggio and Powell argue that institutions are naturally homogenized which is then formulated into institutional isomorphism. Isomorphism can be interpreted as a natural condition that forces an institution to resemble a larger institution. Factors that influence isomorphism include the political situation and the power relations of larger institutions.

Within the framework of institutional isomorphism, there are three mechanisms that trigger isomorphism, namely *coercive*, *mimetic*, and *normative*. First, coercion discusses about homogenization (the result of formal and informal pressure exerted on institutions by other institutions). These conditions are correlated with one another because both depend on cultural expectations, namely that institutions must function. The second mechanism is *mimetic*. A *mimetic* mechanism examines an inter-institutional reciprocity and then an imitation carried out by the lesser institution following a more established institution. The *mimetic* mechanism causes institutional isomorphism in situations where institutional actors/subjects from different locations or fields gravitated towards the same institutional model. The third mechanism is *normative*. The *normative* mechanism emphasizes that the isomorphism process occurs because of the pressure to obey the existing institutional norms. This is intertwined with the high demand for professionalism of actors in institutions. The difficulty to adjust external conditions to the provisions of the norms and professional standards of an institution triggers isomorphism.

Isomorphism occurs in educational institutions in Yogyakarta. In the vicinity Dikpora Yogyakarta, the isomorphism process exists because of the coercive existence in the form of pressure from the Yogyakarta

Government, mimetic in the form of imitation of action with the Central Government, and normative in the form of an effort to obey the norms internalized by the Yogyakarta Provincial Government. Instead of taking the isomorphism step with an educational format, the Dikpora Yogyakarta takes an isomorphism process with institutions that have a legalistic format such as the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the National Police, and the TNI.

The circular issued by the Governor of Yogyakarta contains no educational blueprint.²⁰ Instead, the focus is on, among other things, the involvement of community leaders, and religious leaders; environmental patrols; and supervision by TNI/Police. The only thing that targets children is the initiation of positive activities for teenagers. However, this does not automatically squares with education. In the circular letter, there is not a single point that tries to analyze and accommodate the needs of a specific subject or group of teenagers.

Dikpora Yogyakarta stated that schools had limitations in solving *klitih* problems because *klitih* acted at night and were outside the schools' authority. This leads to a lack of effort from within educational institutions to take full responsibility for *klitih* actions. Hence cooperation with non-educational institutions.²¹ One of them is the collaboration between the Yogyakarta Government and the Yogyakarta Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. This collaboration resulted in "rehabilitating" young *klitih* perpetrators in prisons.²² This inter-institutional cooperation also strengthens the legalistic format that is packaged in the facade of education in Yogyakarta.

Yogyakarta's status as a City of Education is getting eroded because the isomorphism that appears is appearing only to strengthen the legal and judicial power over the population. Even though decentralization of education has been made possible through Law No. 23 of 2014, the Dikpora has the authority to handle educational problems, but this is not implemented. The Dikpora proves to be subservient to instructions from the central government, notably involving the military and the police to stylize the character of students. Students does not have a place or space to express their ideas and interests. The firm hand of the police or the military looms over them. There is no decentralization, there is only centralization that leaves no room for autonomy. Dikpora Yogyakarta often isomorphized into the Yogyakarta Government and other legalistic institutions. Yogyakarta fails to establish itself as a City of Education, a city for learners. Tut Wuri Handayani-Indonesia's prominent principle of education, it conveys giving students independence and can be roughly translated to "giving support from the background"-will only remain a distant dream if legalistic measures remains the first and foremost step in tackling *klitih*.

Conclusion

Institutions will not escape dynamism. Internal and external considerations, as it should, will continue to shape them. Dikpora Yogyakarta is proven to be a loyalist to old institutionalism that narrows their view of problem-solving using legal and formal pathways. They have shown no effort in implementing neo-institutionalism (HI, RCI, SI) for the issue of *klitih* and it will always be a scourge for the community and leaves

Dikpora Yogyakarta's face disheveled. Certainly, changes are needed to contextualize education in Yogyakarta and their institutions. In the end, institutions need to be prudent when analyzing and acting upon the conditions at hand before labelling themselves rightful to bear the name "Yogyakarta, the City of Education". [Athala, Najma, and Vigo]

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Klitih and the Search for Respect

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*"Violence is frequently called irrational.
It has its reasons, however."
(Rene Girard)*

Klitih has come to refer to acts of often fatal street violence by and between teenage boys and young men in the streets of Yogyakarta. Street violence linked to gangs is by no means a new phenomenon, in Yogya or elsewhere throughout Indonesia. The figure of the *preman* has been a recurring one in Indonesia's socio-political landscape, a nexus of contradictions who is both reviled and respected, or to paraphrase Pemuda Pancasila "disliked, but still needed".

A few things however mark *klitih* violence, and its transformation over time from the 1980s until now, as a phenomenon distinct from more common manifestations of *premanisme*—the way thuggery called in Indonesia.

One is that *klitih* violence has been, overwhelmingly, neither instrumental nor utilitarian. Victims have not been robbed of their possessions and there is no indication of material benefit as a core driving motivation. Nor is it sub-contracted violence on behalf of political or economic actors. Police have gone so far as to describe *klitih* as crime without motives.

Another is that many of those targeted have been seemingly random victims. While the demography of victims has been consistent, teenage boys or young men, most did not know the attackers. This change has been noted by gang members from the early 2010s when *klitih* was embedded in clashes between rival gangs where actors were known to one another. Attacks have also often been filmed and edited for circulation on social media platforms such as TikTok. The combination of random targeting together with use of social media is suggestive of ritualised and performative violence.

Klitih derives from the Javanese term for “those with time on their hands”. Researchers of violent extremism have identified the pivotal role of alienation and boredom, particularly in conjunction with socio-economic marginalisation, as a core driver of male violence, including self-harm. This contrasts with conventional focus upon the role of ideology in the radicalisation of young men towards violent behaviour. Violence itself, rather than ideology, can be a language of dissent. It “performs” by communicating messages and producing meanings, generating ways of thinking and relating to the world. Violence is, in this respect, a changing form of communication and social interaction.

In his seminal work, *In Search of Respect*, which examines social marginalisation in a Harlem ghetto, the anthropologist Philippe Bourgois argues that cultures of hyper-masculinity and performative violence are shaped by subjective negotiations of broader sets of structural forces. Male expressions of violence are linked to a political economy undermining men's ability to provide for their families. This can also include structural barriers to participation in cultures of consumption linked to hegemonic constructions of masculinity, identity and social esteem, plus pathways to social mobility.

Identifying some of the contradictory structural forces and pressures faced by young men in a city such as Yogyakarta is not difficult. It is a city of malls, high-end retail, conspicuous middle-class cultures of consumption, together with a growing number of gated housing estates. However, it also has a poverty and unemployment rate far above the national average. Worlds of affluence sit in uneasy tension alongside material deprivation, normalised via reinvented constructions of “tradition” emphasising fatalism and emotional restraint.

It is a city renowned for education, with over 100 institutions of higher learning. Yet for many youths, higher education remains socially and economically inaccessible. Vocational college is an institutional avenue for many poor and working-class youth providing the possibility of a livelihood, but little prospects of upward social mobility. While Indonesia has done much to improve access to education, the quality of secondary school education has remained patchy at best. Scholars such as Rosser have argued that the domination of political interests over school curriculum and resourcing has resulted in emphasis upon training students to be loyal and obedient to nation and state, rather than the acquisition of critical skills.

Within this myriad of structural forces, affluence, consumerism, and global mobility become more inaccessible than ever to poor and working-class young men, something relentlessly highlighted via the fantastical postings of social media influencers.

Expressions of violent masculinity such as *klitih* can be viewed, in this context, as a means for seeking respect and social status among peers with a minimum of resources. Brutality and recklessness become markers of prestige and forms of social capital within an identity economy, giving rage and frustration violent expression.

Beyond public outrage and moral condemnation of the brutality and irrationality of *klitih*, it poses difficult questions regarding the socially embedded nexus between masculinity and violence. This is reflected in responses to *klitih* itself, ranging from calls for a return to extrajudicial killing to condemnation from former preman that *klitih* violence is cowardly in contrast to the apparently manly honour and rule-bound violence of their past. Inherent to both responses is the assumption that violence is integral to power and masculinity. The point of divergence is regarding how, and why.

There is a long-established historical pattern of state responses to street violence that revolves around two poles. One is the elimination via mass arrests and incarceration or extrajudicial purges, such as the Petrus-mysterious gunmen-killings of the 1980s. The other is incorporation, whereby the *jago*, *gali* or *preman*—Indonesian thugs—are incorporated into social and political structures through processes of *patronage* and “education”. This has been a means by which the violence of so-called *layang lepas* is integrated into formal constellations of state-linked or approved ormas that operate within a broader political economy of coercion and violence, for example as part of informal security structures. Unlike the uniformed *jago* of a paramilitary ormas however Yogya's *klitih* boys are negotiating the impossibilities and social fragmentation of late-stage neo-liberalism.

People have a right to feel safe in the streets without fear that they will fall victim to random violence. Any sustained and meaningful intervention to tackle *klitih* must, however, go beyond these two poles by addressing its structural and cultural drivers and listening to what this kind of violence is communicating, not just about the perpetrators but of the society that has produced it, and them. As the author Jean Genet expressed it, “Crimes of which a people is ashamed constitute its real history. The same is true of man.”

Jogja: The Dark Knight Rises





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A Little Lifeboat Called BALAIRUNG

Soeharto toppled. Freedom of expression is said to have risen. The mainstream media, which during the New Order became the extension of Departemen Penerangan (Ministry of Information), suddenly turns and begins to criticize the landlady. For the student press, this reorientation is both a threat and a challenge. Because, their bargaining power lies in the broadcasting of news that shed a light to the movement against the government. On November 2, 1998, BALAIRUNG initiated a sarasehan (gathering) for student press located in Java and Bali. A number of student press entities contributed to formulate the post 21 May 1998 (the fall Soeharto) reposition. However, Hasan Bachtiar noted that this gathering merely opened the discourse, without drawing any conclusions.¹

The theme of the gathering was “Searching for New Spaces in the Age of Openness”. In the gathering, BALAIRUNG chose a double role, to be a community paper as well as press of discourse. The first orientation is taken as a “back to campus” step, after national issues were always taken over by mainstream media with large capital. After that, the student newspaper or BALKON was born. Meanwhile, the second orientation is the manifestation of split personality carried by student press activists, which is as a journalist and a student. Accordingly, Jurnal BALAIRUNG (BALAIRUNG Journal) was born, a journal with a journalistic and scientific approach.

However, reorientation from the state-centric discourse towards community discourse is not a new thing. In the third congress in 1971, Association of Indonesian Student Press adopted a “back to campus” policy.² According to Ahmad Zaini Abar, this phenomenon is the circular pattern between convergence and divergence.³ Convergence happens when power consolidation of the state is happening. Student press, which participates in the consolidation, faces a “honeymoon” phase with the state. Because of that, they come back to campus. But, after the consolidation process is complete, divergence happens. The state abuses their power and becomes authoritarian. In this phase, student press widen their news scope to be the government’s watchdog.

After the fall of Soeharto, the student press wanted to be active in their own community because they realized that they have been alienated from it. Meanwhile, Hasan Bachtiar said that mainstream media with advantages in capital, production tools, and news connection, come along to support total reformation.⁴ “If the student press wants to continue their bombast, it at least needs to be contextualized with the community,” wrote Didik Supriyanto.⁵ But, rereading of that argument needs to be done. Is it true that the mainstream media is still the same with how they were perceived by the activists of student press after the fall of Soeharto?

As the privilege of the mainstream media, capital is like a double-edged sword. In one way, it guarantees the media to operate continuously. “Dapur tetap mengepul”-to keep the kitchen cooking-the way we say it in the student press. But, at the same time, it needs to be turned into more capital to ensure accumulation. This, in turn, implicates the production method in the press world and digital media. They do not intend to present news that is factual, educating, healthily entertaining, and become a form of social control. Instead, they transform into news producers that hunt for clicks in order to earn a lot of advertising and thus, money.

Ideally, big capital should push media enterprises to produce quality journalistic products. But, orientation in surplus of capital does not leave anything beside chaos of information in the virtual world. According to Bill Kovach and Tom Rosentiel, one of the elements of journalism, which is discipline to do verification, is fading.⁶ Instead, the mainstream media shift to resemble entertainment or infotainment, which aims to entertain. Whereas, journalism focuses on the process of providing functional truth. Although mouth-cracking journalism⁷ has appeared from the beginning of the millennium, now they are growing even bigger along with the swift development of the digital industry.

This chaos does not yet count the political economic motives behind the media. Ross Tapsell identified three common phenomenons along the development of media oligarchy in Indonesia.⁸ First, media owners would get politically strong. Second,

they cultivate wealth. *Third*, media enterprises become a dynasty by placing the owner's child as a strategic structure holder. In this context, the journalism element as watchdog is also fading.⁹ Mainstream media do not establish public agendas, but they are dragged down by algorithms and interests. According to Jakob Oetama, mainstream media are not able to carry the role of meaningful journalism, but they are trapped in factual journalism.¹⁰ That being said, the products are either sensational or attached with the agenda setting of the media conglomerates.

The turbid, noisy, and wasteful situation has in turn encouraged the rise of alternative media with small capital. Different from mainstream media, alternative media not only contain facts, but also meaning, or in our language, discourse. Project Multatuli, for example, declared that their mission is to serve the public by giving a voice to the voiceless, spotlighting the marginalized, and reporting on the underreported. BaleBengong, a community media based in Bali produces news with the people's perspective consistently. But, all of that can not be compared with the sensational and interest conflicted news produced by the mainstream media. Although alternative media is beginning to appear, more efforts are needed to win the discourse in public space, especially in issues that are close to the students.

In response to that situation, BALAIRUNG decided to do a special report in some areas, like Jakarta, Purworejo, Sukoharjo, and Semarang. This decision is taken as long as the issue is valued significantly, important and urgent, close with the readers, and actual. Besides that, interest bias of the mainstream media and internal capability are also taken into consideration. Although, at the same time, effort to work on alternative discourse on campus is still ongoing. For example, the relevance of student governance, student involvement in the rector election, rights fulfillment for UGM Covid-19 task force, etc. In line with the explanation of Amir Effendi Siregar, the split personality to report national and local issues must be taken, as long as the approach is not lacking, complimented by data, and precise.¹¹

From May to June this year, the website Balairungpress.com has been visited 15,875 times. Six top visitors come from Jakarta (2,199), Surabaya (1,151), Semarang (946), Depok (504), Bandung (447), and Makassar (312). The large number of visitors from outside of Yogyakarta encourage us to report something beyond our own community. Instead of following the footsteps of mainstream media to gain more readers, we argue that the identity of the student press is attached with their intention to produce alternative discourse, inside the campus, regionally, and nationally.

Despite that, this reposition is not intended to be an effort to leave the community and depart towards the warzone in national issues. Instead, we intend to prioritize the local community to keep the sovereignty of information and, in turn, identity. Through this *klitih*-themed magazine, we emphasize our role as alternative media, with concern towards the local community and discourse. Because, other than the fact that *klitih* is close with the readers both spatially and structurally, we do not see *klitih* merely as juvenile delinquency as explained by the mainstream media. We believe it as a structural problem which originated from our education system.

Moreover, digital transformation not only encourages the growth of mainstream media, political influence of few elites, and capital interest, but at the same time also builds democratization, public discourse, and policy reform.¹² Tapsell said that the power of counter-oligarchs emerged in the bottom-up flow of information through new media platforms such as social media, online pages, and others.¹³ For us, it indicates an urgency to widen transition scope from the printing world to the digital world. Rather than merely changing mode, we try to jump higher by seriously proliferating products in the form of audio-visual, one-sitting reading materials, and others.

In one deep breath, the student press is an alternative media with concern towards community and discourse. Community paper does not mean curling down on campus because we are not capable of competing with mainstream media, but as an effort to protect the sovereignty of information in the middle of the vast changing information with bravery to widen our scope when needed. Our interpretation of the press of discourse is also not limited to scientific articles manifested in journal product, but it is also attached behind the "meaning" of every product and the behavior of student press.

That sail of the big ship named mainstream media is already torn apart. Resembling a lifeboat, student press and alternative media with small capital emerge to guide the public so that they do not get carried away by the tsunami of information. It is because we do not report any factual reality without a sensible sense of the ideal condition, but we are in the transformative journalism corridor to break the frozen ice. We are not just a university's public relation department, or the voice of the movement, but the perfect mix between journalists, scholars, activists, and more than any of that, a common student in a not-so-special university. [Supreme Leader]

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Launching Soon!

“Ekosida”

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